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Abstract
This paper explores the quantitative implications of a class of endogenous growth models
for cross-country income diﬀerences. These models exhibit international spillovers, no scale
eﬀects and conditional convergence, and thus they overcome some diﬃculties faced by the early
generation of endogenous growth models. Cross-country income diﬀerences arise in the model
a st h er e s u l to fd i ﬀerent distortions in the accumulation of rival factors of production, the
objects, and in the accumulation of nonrival factor of production, the ideas. We show that
object gaps play a much larger role to explain income gaps in models with endogenous TFP
than in models with exogenous TFP. We also show, using a carefully calibrated version of the
model, that most of the cross-country diﬀerences in output per worker are explained by barriers
to the accumulation of rival factors (physical and human capital) rather than by barriers to the
accumulation of knowledge.
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ripoll@pitt.edu.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
What does growth theory tell us about the causes of cross-country income diﬀerences? Seminal
papers by Parente and Prescott (1994), Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997), and Hall and Jones
(1999) have shown that diﬀerences in total factor productivity, or TFP, are key for understanding
income diﬀerences, and Parente (1998) has called for a theory of TFP. Growth theories seek to
understand the endogenous evolution of TFP over time, and therefore it is natural that they oﬀer
some explanation for the observed dispersion of TFPs across countries. However, endogenous
growth models, as developed by Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), and Rebelo (1991) among
others, have been criticized for their seemingly implausible predictions regarding scale eﬀects and
divergence, as well as other issues (see Easterly et al., 1993; Jones, 1995; and Howitt, 2000).
To overcome some of the problems, a second generation of growth models has recently been
proposed (Parente and Prescott, 1994; Eaton and Kortum, 1996; Howitt, 2000; and Klenow &
Rodríguez-Clare, 2004, among others). These models allow for international diﬀusion of knowledge,
and eliminate scale eﬀects both in growth rates and in levels. Countries in these models share a
common long-term growth rate, at least for the subset of growing countries, and their dynamics
display conditional convergence. Long-term growth rates are determined worldwide, while country
policies and speciﬁc conditions aﬀect relative income levels. This second generation of growth
models provides the needed theory of relative total factor productivities.
This paper explores the theoretical and quantitative implications of this second generation of
growth models for cross-country income diﬀerences. A key insight of endogenous growth models is
that ‘income gaps’ are caused by ‘object gaps’ and ‘idea gaps’ (Romer, 1993). More precisely, these
models regard long-term income diﬀerences as the result of two types of distortions or frictions:
distortions associated with the accumulation of rival factors of production, the objects, such as
distortional taxes on capital and labor, as well as risks of expropriation, conﬁscation, thievery,
squatting, extortion, kidnapping, etc.; and distortions associated with the accumulation of nonrival
factors of production, the ideas, such as taxes on innovation and adoption activities, costly patent
application and patent protection, limited intellectual property rights, and overall, risk of imitation
and copying.
The main issue we address in this paper is the relative importance of each type of friction
in explaining cross-country income diﬀerences. Our assessment resembles the one carried out by
1Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) in “Unbundling Institutions”, but our decomposition is based on
a speciﬁc theory of endogenous TFP and, therefore, it is fully microfounded. The fundamental
frictions in our model are two rates of expropriation, one aﬀecting physical capital, and the other
aﬀecting ideas via limited patent protection.
The main ﬁnding of the paper is that, according to growth theory, income diﬀerences are
primarily explained by distortions to the accumulation of rival factors rather than distortions in
the accumulation of ideas. This ﬁnding is surprising in light of the results of Klenow and Rodríguez-
Clare (1997) —KR (1997) hereafter,— and Hall and Jones (1999) —HJ henceforth— who, using models
of exogenous TFP, suggest instead that income diﬀerences are primarily explained by barriers to
the accumulation of knowledge. We show analytically that frictions to the accumulation of rival
factors are magniﬁed when TFP is endogenous, and show numerically, using a carefully calibrated
version of the model, that this ampliﬁcation is large. In fact, our quantitative ﬁndings are closer
to those of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) -MRW hereafter- than to KR (1997) or HJ, but the
mechanism and policy implications are completely diﬀerent.
Our model builds on Howitt (2000), and particularly on Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2004)
—KR (2004) henceforth. They extend a quality-ladder model of growth to include international
diﬀusion of knowledge, and eliminate scale eﬀects at the country level. A key component of these
models is the “catch-up” externality, one that captures the idea that lagging behind the world
technology frontier facilitates technological progress via adoption. This externality determines the
speed of technological diﬀusion.
We diﬀer from the two papers above in that we use Romer’s (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s
(1997) variety approach instead of the Shumpetarian approach. This alternative formulation is
analytically more tractable and allows to obtain closed-form results that are easy to compare to
related ﬁndings in the literature. For example, we show that the standard model of exogenous TFP
is a particular case of our model when the speed of diﬀusion is inﬁnite. We also show analytically
that distortions to the accumulation of rival factors are ampliﬁed as the speed of diﬀusion decreases.
Furthermore, our closed-form solutions allow us to perform exact variance decompositions analogous
to those of KR (1997), and therefore we can compare our results directly to theirs.1 Finally, we
1The steady-state solution for output in existing quality-ladder models has an additive structure, while it has a
multiplicative structure in models with expanding varieties. This facilitates variance decomposition as well as other
results.
2document that this added tractability of the varieties model comes at no major cost because the
quantitative results are similar to those of quality-ladder models.
For the quantitative assessment, we calibrate a version of our model following Howitt’s (2000)
suggestion of using the speed of convergence as a matching target. For this purpose, we estimate
the growth regression equation implied by our model and ﬁnd a slow speed of convergence, similar
to other estimates in the literature. We further show that the model can only produce a slow
speed of convergence if the ratio of increasing returns to speed of diﬀusion is large. This ratio is
also the magnitude of ampliﬁcation mentioned above. Therefore, the slow speed of convergence is
what ultimately explains the main ﬁnding of the paper that distortions to the accumulation of rival
factors of production are the prime determinant of cross-country income diﬀerences.
Our quantitative ﬁndings diﬀer from those of Parente and Prescott (1994) and KR (2004) who
stress the key role of barriers to the adoption of technology and the accumulation of knowledge.
Although the models are diﬀerent in important respects, for example increasing returns and ex-
ternalities are central in our model while Parente and Prescott model only adoption decisions in a
constant returns to scale framework, we think that the key diﬀerence is in the calibration proce-
dure. As mentioned, we calibrate our model to match a slow speed of convergence similar to what
has been documented in the growth regression literature. Parente and Prescott instead calibrate
their model to Japanese data, a country that experienced a high speed of convergence. KR (2004)
calibrate their model to match social returns to R&D. We show that their calibration also implies
a high speed of convergence. We consider our results robust as they are based on well documented
cross-country evidence.
Lucas (1988) asks: “Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead
the Indian economy to grow like Indonesia’s or Egypt’s?” Recent growth theories provide an
answer to this question. The long-term growth rate of India is likely tied to worldwide growth
rate, but India’s income level is tied to India’s distortions. According to our calculations, India’s
barriers to the accumulation of factors explain up to 73% of the income gap relative to the US,
and the remaining 27% is explained by distortions to the accumulation of knowledge. These ﬁgures
suggest that an Indian government with the will and power to reduce the income gap must focus
on eliminating barriers to the accumulation of rival factors rather than nonrival ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reproduces benchmark results obtained in a frame-
3work of exogenous TFP using our database for 1996. Section 3 presents the main results of the
paper using an extended Solow model with endogenous TFP, but exogenous saving rates and R&D
investment rates. The section summarizes analytical results, estimation of growth regressions, cal-
ibration of the model, and it also reports the main quantitative ﬁndings. Section 4 endogenizes
savings rates and R&D investment rates using a version of Romer’s (1990) and Barro and Sala-
i-Martin’s (1997) variety model. We show that the steady of this model maps exactly into the
Solow model of Section 3 but provides additional equations to determine savings rates and R&D
investment rates. The two fundamental frictions in the microfounded model are an expropriation
rate of physical assets, and an expropriation rate of ideas determined by the random duration of
patents. We show that the results of Section 3 are reinforced when saving and R&D rates are
endogenous. Section 5 concludes.
2 Exogenous TFP Models
The neoclassical growth model has been the workhorse of most existing attempts to quantify the
sources of cross-country levels of output per worker. Prominent examples of these attempts have
arrived at opposite conclusions. On the one hand MRW found that 78% of the world income
variance could be explained by diﬀerences in human capital and saving rates. On the other hand,
KR (1997), and HJ found that productivity diﬀerences are the dominant source of dispersion of
output per worker, accounting for around 60% of the variance. The key reason why conclusions
diﬀer in these studies can be traced back to the measurement of human capital. While MRW uses
only secondary schooling, KR (1997) in addition uses primary and terciary schooling, as well as
experience and schooling quality.
In spite of their diﬀerences, these studies use a common framework; namely, the Solow model
augmented with human capital in which total factor productivity evolves exogenously. More specif-






where K is aggregate physical capital, H is aggregate human capital, A represents labor augmenting
technological progress, Y aggregate output, and Z ≡ A1−α is total factor productivity (TFP). In
4what follows, we loosely use the term TFP to refer both to A and Z. Aggregate human capital
is deﬁned as Ht ≡ hLt,w h e r eL is the labor force, and h human capital per worker. Output per
worker y = Y/L is then given by
yt = Ztkα
t h1−α.
If TFP is exogenous and k endogenous, diﬀerences in k across countries reﬂect diﬀerences in Zt.
To account for this dependence MRW, KR (1997), and HJ rewrite output per worker, or ‘income’
for short, as
yt = At · Xt, (1)
where Xt ≡ κ
α
1−αh and κ ≡ K/Y. The term At = Z
1+ α
1−α
t captures both the direct eﬀect of
TFP in output per worker, Zt, and the indirect eﬀect through capital, Z
α/(1−α)
t ,w h i l et e r mX
captures “factor intensities”. If TFP is assumed exogenous, then equation (1) is appropriate to
study the sources of cross-country variations in y because X is determined by parameters diﬀerent
from the productivity level A.2 Moreover, studies typically assume α =1 /3 so that the exponent
1+α/(1 − α)=1 .5 signiﬁcantly enhances the role of TFP, and reduces the role of factors, in
explaining income diﬀerences.
KR (1997) uses equation (1) to perform a variance decomposition exercise to assess the contri-
butions of X and A to world income dispersion. An issue there is how to handle the covariance
between A and X, a term that accounts for 35% of income dispersion, and for which exogenous
theories of TFP have no predictions. As KR (1997) acknowledges, this large covariance suggests
that the productivity level A is actually endogenous. In order to account for this possibility, they
assign half of the covariance term as part of the contribution to X and the other half to A.T h e y








Using a database of 91 countries for 19963 and assuming α =1 /3, we obtain ΦX =4 0 %and
ΦA = 60%, which is similar to the result reported by KR (1997) for 1985.
2In the neoclassical growth model the steady state capital-output ratio is determined by preferences, α and the
exogenous growth rate of TFP (see Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 2003).
3We use information from the Penn World Tables Mark 6.1 and the Barro and Lee data set for schooling. We
only include countries with information on investment rates between 1960-1996, and construct capital stocks using
the perpetual inventory method. The construction of human capital series is described below in Section 3.4.1.
5HJ also uses equation (1) for levels accounting purposes. Rather than using the variance as KR
(1997) do, they decompose output per worker in each country into the three multiplicative terms
in equation (1): the contribution of physical capital intensity κα/(1−α), the contribution of human
capital per worker h, and the contribution of TFP. Table 1 updates HJ’s results using our 1996
data set and bundling together the contribution of factors under X. All numbers in Table 1 are
levels relative to the US in 1996. Similar to HJ, Table 1 shows that as one moves from richer to
poorer countries down the table, X becomes gradually lower than in the US (for instance, in Kenya
it is 29% of US’ level), but A becomes proportionally much lower (it is around 16% of US’ level in
Kenya). On average, the ﬁve poorest countries in our sample (Mali, Malawi, Rwanda, Niger and
Zaire) have 23% of US’ factor intensity as measured by X,a n do n l y12% of US’ productivity level.
Notice that the ﬁve poorest countries have just 2.6% of US’ output per worker; i.e., output in the
US is around 39 times higher. Table 1 implies that this 39-fold diﬀerence can be decomposed as
the multiplication of a 4.55-fold diﬀerence in factors X,a n da8.55-fold diﬀerence in A. This result
is consistent with the variance-decomposition exercise of KR (1997) reported above, and with the
advantage that it does not have to deal with the distribution of the covariance term.
In any case, both levels accounting exercises reported above are based on equation (1), which
assumes TFP to be exogenous. In the remainder of the paper we relax this assumption. Part of
the motivation to relax this assumption is to better understand the covariance between X and A.
3 An Extended Solow Model with Endogenous TFP
3.1 The Model
Consider the following Solow model extended to incorporate endogenous accumulation of TFP









where Ht = hLt, h is exogenous, and At represents productivity. Parameter β determines the
degree of increasing returns in the production of ﬁnal goods. KR (2004), for example, assumes
β =1 . Output can be consumed, invested in physical capital stock, or allocated to research and
6development (R&D)
Yt = Ct + It + Rt. (4)
In this section we treat both the saving rate s and the fraction of R&D expenditures on total
output sR as exogenous and constant, but potentially diﬀerent across countries. We relax these
assumptions in the next section by providing microfoundations in a decentralized model. The
aggregates stocks of capital and human capital evolve according to:
·
Kt = sYt − δKt, (5)
·
Ht = gLHt. (6)
where gL is the growth rate of population. Moreover, TFP evolves according to
·
At = BtRt/Lt = BtsRyt. (7)
where Bt is the productivity of per-capita R&D expenditures, and yt ≡ Yt/Lt. This formulation
states that technological progress depends on per-capita R&D expenditures rather than the total
amount of R&D. This restriction is required to eliminate scale eﬀects in levels, as discussed by KR
(2004). This type of scale eﬀects occur when the level of per-capita variables depend on the size of
the population. They are hard to justify because large countries like China or India do not have
particularly large levels of income per-capita. Moreover, we postulate the following functional form








t, with η>0, (8)
where d is a parameter and A∗
t is the technology frontier, which could be country speciﬁc but it
is assumed to be exogenous to the country. Equation (8) allows two types of externalities to TFP
accumulation: a “catch-up” externality, (A∗
t/At)




η captures the idea that lagging behind the technology frontier facilitates technological
progress via adoption of existing ideas. This eﬀect is often called “beneﬁts to backwardness” because
a more backward country would have a higher catch-up term. Parameter η>0 captures the strength
7of this catching-up externality, and determines the speed of technological diﬀusion. The term Aν
t
allows for positive or negative externalities in domestic R&D activities. The endogenous growth
literature, e.g. Jones (1995), typically assumes positive externalities so that ν>0.
Equations (7) and (8) imply that technological progress is always costly. It occurs only if some
resources are diverted to technological advancement. This view is supported by Keller (2004) and
Lederman and Maloney (2003), who argue that there is no indication that technology diﬀusion is
inevitable or automatic, but rather, domestic investments are needed. It is instructive to compare
our formulation to that of KR (2004). In their model, the law of motion for TFP satisﬁes
·
At =( BRt/Lt +  )(1− At/A∗
t).
This formulation allows free technological diﬀusion governed by the parameter  . It turns out that
 >0 is required in their model to guarantee the existence of a steady state with positive growth
for countries with very small sR. This is due to the fact that the productivity of per-capita R&D
investment is bounded by the constant B, a bound obtained when At/A∗
t =0 . In contrast, in our
formulation the productivity of R&D investment Bt goes to inﬁnity as At/A∗
t goes to zero. This
guarantees that countries with small sR do not fall permanently behind and their steady state is
well deﬁned without the need of free diﬀusion. Moreover, parameter η allows us to replicate results
obtained under free diﬀusion. For example, we show below that the standard Solow model with
exogenous TFP is obtained in our framework by making η = ∞. The multiplicative formulation (8)
is more convenient for analytical purposes, particularly regarding variance decomposition exercises












83.2 Balanced Growth Characterization




where Xt ≡ κ
α
1−αh and κ ≡ K/Y. Equation (11) is similar to the one employed by KR (1997) and
HJ, as given by (1), with the important diﬀerence that At is now endogenous. For this reason, this
expression is not adequate anymore for variance decomposition because output is not written in
terms of fundamentals. To obtain a proper expression, deﬁn et h eg r o w t hr a t eo fav a r i a b l eV as
gVt≡
·


















We can now determine the balanced growth rate of the economy. Along a balanced growth path
(BGP) all variables grow at constant rates. Therefore, from equation (13) and the deﬁnition of X,
κt and Xt are constant along such path. Moreover, from equation (12) it follows that dgAt/dt =
gA [ηg +( φ + β − 1)gA]=0 . For this equality to hold, either gA =0or ηg +( φ + β − 1)gA =0 .
Focusing on the relevant case gA > 0,o n eﬁnds that
gA =
1 − φ − β
η
g. (14)
Thus, technological progress and economic growth in this economy is tied to the evolution of
the technological frontier, and all countries grow at the same rate in the long run. It is natural to
restrict parameter values so that countries do not fall behind or move ahead of the technological
frontier. This requires gA = g, which only occurs if the following restriction is satisﬁed.
Assumption 1. 1 − φ − β = η.
Notice that under Assumption 1, ν =1−β in equation (8), which means that there are positive
9externalities in the accumulation of TFP if β<1. It is easy to derive the following results from
equations (10)-(14) and Assumption 1:
gA = g, gy = βg, gK = gY = βg+ gL, (15)
κ =
s
βg + gL + δ
. (16)
The last equation implies that the factor intensity of an economy, X = κ
α
1−αh, only depends on
its saving rate and human capital.
3.3 Levels Accounting
We now derive the implications of the model for cross-country income and productivity diﬀerences.
These implications are summarized in the following proposition.

























Proof: Equation (17) is obtained from equation (12) using the balanced growth result that gAt = g
and Assumption 1. Equation (18) results from substituting (17) into (11).
There are four important results in Proposition 1. First, equation (17) states that the techno-
logical level of the economy depends positively on the factor intensity of the economy X as well as
other R&D related parameters. The model predicts that economies with lower factor intensity will
have, other things equal, lower TFP levels. Moreover, economies with lower R&D investment rates
or with access to a lower technological frontier, say because of physical or cultural distances, will
also display lower TFP levels.
Second, equation (18) describes the determination of steady state per-capita output in terms of
components related to factors X and other components. This formulation is analogous to the one
10used by KR (1997) in equation (1), but the role of factors is adjusted to take into account their
eﬀect on TFP as described by equation (17). The adjustment increases the role of X by a factor
of β/η > 0, a sort of ‘ampliﬁcation eﬀect’. Thus, endogenizing TFP unambiguously increases the
role of factors in explaining world income dispersion. The positive dependence of the ampliﬁcation
parameter on β reﬂects the indirect eﬀect that additional factors of production have on output
by increasing the TFP level. The negative dependence on η reﬂects the negative eﬀect on long
term output of closing the productivity gap relative to the frontier. A smaller gap reduces the
productivity of the R&D sector and therefore total output.
Third, (18) provides a decomposition in terms of the fundamentals of the model. On the one
hand, changes in saving rates s and human capital only aﬀect b X but not b A. On the other hand,
changes in sR and A∗ aﬀect b A but not b X. Finally, although changes in g aﬀect both b X and b A, g is
identical across countries. Thus, equation (18) provides a clear separation between R&D investment
rate sR and the (country speciﬁc) technological frontier A∗ on the one hand, and investment rate s
and human capital h on the other hand. Recall that in this section we treat s and sR as exogenous,
so there is no feedback from s to sR or viceversa. In Section 4 we provide microfoundations for
these investment decisions and show that such feedback exists, and that the results from the levels
accounting decomposition proposed in (18) are reinforced.
Finally, our model includes the standard Solow model with exogenous TFP as a special case.
TFP becomes exogenous to the economy when the catching up parameter η goes to inﬁnity. In this
case, the productivity level is determined by the technological frontier, At = A∗
t, regardless of factor
endowments. Moreover, in this particular case, equation (1) provides a meaningful factorization of
income in terms of diﬀerent parameters.
3.4 Calibration
We now explore the quantitative implications of the model for cross-country dispersion. The key
equation for this purpose is (18), which provides a solution in terms of parameters of the model.
We recover b A as a residual from (18) given values of the observable variables y, κ,a n dh,a n do f
parameters α, β,a n dη.O n c eb A and b X are obtained, we can assess their relative contribution in
explaining income dispersion.
In order to compare our results to KR (2004), we use their same parameter values for α, δ,
11gy,a n dgL.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w ea s s u m eα =1 /3, δ =0 .08, gy =0 .015 and gL =0 .011 respectively.
The key parameters for our purposes are β and η. We consider three alternative calibrations of
these parameters. The ﬁrst calibration exploits existing estimates of social returns to schooling
provided by Bils and Klenow (2000); the second calibration uses existing estimates about the speed
of convergence; the third uses estimates based on cross-country growth regressions derived from
our model.
3.4.1 Calibration based on social returns to schooling
The cross-section of human capital h employed in this paper is constructed using the standard
practice of transforming years of schooling and experience into stocks of human capital using
estimates of private returns to education and experience. The speciﬁcation used in this paper
is the following one employed by Bils and Klenow (2000):
h =e x p
³




where s is average years of schooling, a is the average age of workers, and f(s) is the private returns
to schooling (a decreasing function of the years of schooling).
Equations (18) and (19) imply that the long term social returns to schooling exceed the private
returns by a factor of 1+β/η. Bils and Klenow (2000) provide estimates of private returns to
schooling and plausible bounds for the corresponding social returns. All human capital series
used in this paper use their intermediate speciﬁcation f(s)=( 0 .18/(1 − 0.28))s1−0.28 that implies
moderate decreasing private returns to schooling. This speciﬁcation produces similar results to the
o n eu s e db yH J .F o rt h i ss p e c i ﬁcation of private returns, Bils and Klenow provide an upper bound
for 1+β/η of 1.85, and use an intermediate value of 1.5 for their computations.4 This motivates
us to use a value of 0.5 for β/η as our ﬁrst calibration.
3.4.2 Calibration based on speed of convergence
Extensive literature has documented that countries seem to converge very slowly to well-deﬁned
steady states. Barro (1997) summarizes existing literature on the topic and ﬁnds a speed of conver-
4They denote 1/(1 − φ) the ratio of social to private returns to schooling. The intermediate and upper bound of
φ in their Table 2 (p. 1169) are 1/3 and 0.46 respectively.
12gence of 2.5%, a ﬁnding that has recently received further support from Hauk and Wacziarg (2004).
Models with exogenous TFP cannot replicate this slow speed of convergence for plausible values of
the capital share. On the other hand, models with endogenous TFP typically exhibit lower rates
of convergence depending on the degree of long term increasing returns. Our second calibration
exploits this connection to back up a value of β/η consistent with a speed of convergence of 2.5%.
The Appendix shows that the dynamic system of our model can be approximated around the
steady state by the following system of log-linear diﬀerential equations:
dln(yt)
dt
= −(1 − α)(gL + δ + g (1 − β))ln(y/y∗)+(1− α)β [gL + δ + g(1 − β − η)]ln(a/a∗) (20)
dln(at)
dt
= gln(y/y∗) − g(η + β)ln(a/a∗), (21)






,a n dat = At/A∗












gy =0 , (22)
where ψ ≡ (gL + gy/β + δ)(1− α).S i n c e αgy =0 .005, this equation can be approximated by
(λ + ψ)(λ +( η/β)gy) ≈ 0. Therefore the eigenvalues are approximated by λ1 ≈− (η/β)gy and
λ2 ≈−(gL + gy/β + δ)(1− α).F o rs u ﬃciently large t, the speed of convergence is determined by
the smaller root (in absolute value). For the parameter values assumed, and given that β ≤ 1,t h i s
approximation yields λ2 . −0.07, which would imply a large speed of convergence unless |λ1| < |λ2|.
Therefore, a plausible speed of convergence of 2.5% requires λ1 ≈− 0.025,o rβ/η ≈ gy/0.025 = 0.6,
which is our second calibration for β/η.
3 . 4 . 3 C a l i b r a t i o nb a s e do ng r o w t hr e g r e s s i o n s
Our third calibration uses the full structure of the model and regression analysis. The Appendix
shows that the solution to the system (20) and (21) can be expressed in the following form:













, 0 <T<t ,
and λ1 < 0, λ2 < 0 are the solutions to the characteristic equation (22). A stochastic version
13of (23) can be estimated using cross-country data. Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), we
estimate the equation above using OLS on a cross-section of 71 countries between 1960 and 2000.5
We approximate the steady state value y∗ by controlling for average saving rates. We choose
T =1 0 , but the results are not sensitive to this choice. We use the estimated values of a1 and
a2 to solve for λ1 and λ2, and then use these values to solve for η and β.W e ﬁnd β =0 .35 and
η =0 .41. Thus, our third calibration for β/η is 0.85. Coincidentally, this value corresponds to the
upper bound of social returns to schooling provided by Bils and Klenow (2000).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Levels Accounting
We now show how the levels accounting results of KR (1997) and HJ are aﬀected once the assump-
tion of exogenous TFP is relaxed. The results clearly show that factors of production (i.e., saving
rates and human capital) are signiﬁcantly more important than other factors in explaining cross-
country labor productivity and income diﬀerences. In particular, diﬀerences in R&D investment
rates, in country-speciﬁc technological frontiers, or in the productivity of R&D investment play an
important but secondary role in accounting for the cross-country variation of productivities.
Tables 2 and 3 report levels accounting results obtained from (18) for diﬀerent values of β/η.
Table 2 follows the same methodology of Table 1. The ﬁrst row of the table reports the results
for the exogenous TFP model. According to this model, the main cause of extreme poverty is low
TFP productivity. The poorest countries in the world have only around 1/32 of the US income.
While factor intensities in these countries are around 1/4 of US values, their TFP levels are only
around 1/8 of US. This picture is completely reversed if TFP is endogenous. For β/η =0 .5,f o r
example, factor diﬀerences now account for an income ratio of around 1/8, while diﬀerences in
other TFP components, included under the label b A, account for a ratio of only around 1/4.F o r
β/η =0 .85,d i ﬀerences in factors can account for a ratio of incomes of around 1/16 while the
remaining components can account for a ratio of only around 1/2.
For the average of the 86 countries, the ﬁrst row of Table 2 suggests that both factors and
TFP diﬀerences account similarly for the income ratio of around 1/3. However, the role of factors
5The sample of countries includes those with data available for 1960, 1970 and 2000 for the following variables:
output per worker from Penn World Tables v. 6.1 (available electronically at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/), and
average total years of schooling in population over 25 years of age from Barro and Lee’s (2000) update.
14increases dramatically once the endogeneity of TFP is taken into account. For β/η =0 .6, factor
diﬀerences can account for an income ratio of 2/5 while other components can only account for a
ratio of 4/5. Finally, for the case of β/η =0 .85, almost all the diﬀerence in income is accounted by
factors.
Table 3 reports variance decomposition results using the methodology of KR (1997) described
by equation (2). The ﬁrst row reports results for the exogenous TFP models. According to
these models, diﬀerences in factor intensities account for around 40% of income diﬀerences while
TFP diﬀerences account for around 60%. These contributions split the covariance term, which
accounts for 35% of the variance, equally between factors and TFP. Allowing TFP to be endogenous
signiﬁcantly aﬀects these results. For β/η =0 .5, factors now account for around 60% of the variance
and the covariance term is reduced to only 20% of the total variance. For β/η =0 .6 factors explain
around 2/3 of the income variance and the covariance is reduced to 15%. Finally, for β/η =0 .85
factors explain almost 3/4 and the covariance is close to zero. This last result is similar to the
one found by MRW although for diﬀerent reasons. While MRW stress diﬀerences in human capital
stocks across countries as well as a large share of capital (both physical and human) in production
of 0.7, we stress the endogeneity of TFP and its eﬀect on increasing the role of saving rates and
human capital.
3.5.2 Further implications
Social rates of return to R&D We now discuss some implications of the model for the social
rates of return to R&D. KR (2004) calibrate their model to match a target value of the social rate
of return to R&D. Jones and Williams (1998) show that if
·
A = G(A,R), the social rate of return
to R&D rs can be expressed as rs =( ∂Y/∂A)/PA +∂G/∂A+gPA,w h e r ePA =( ∂G/∂R)
−1 is the
price of ideas. In our model, G is deﬁned from equation (9) as G(A,R)=constant · A
φ
t Rt.T h i s
















(1 − α)gy − (rs − gL)sR
¸
. (24)
15One can compute β/η from this equation given some target values of rs and sR.T h e s ev a l u e s
must satisfy the restriction (1 − α)gy − (rs − gL)sR > 0 so that the β/η remains positive.6 This
restriction means that a high social rate of return must correspond to a relative low R&D investment
rate and vice versa. Finally, notice that β/η computed in this way is an increasing function of both
sR and rs (given rs >g L).
There are three shortcomings in using (24) to compute β/η. First, feasible target values for
the social rate of return vary widely and are typically very large. For example, Coe and Helpman
(1995) estimate rates of return to R&D of 123% for the G7 and 85% for the remaining OECD
countries, while van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) ﬁnd returns of 68% in
the G7 and 15% for the remaining OECD countries. For the U.S, Griliches and Lichtenber (1984)
estimate returns of 71%, and Terlecky (1980) and Scherer (1982) ﬁnd returns above 100%.J o n e s
and Williams (1998) suggest even larger values. KR (2004) calibrate their model using a target
value for the social returns to R&D of 26%. This is a conservative value given the existing estimates.
Second, available estimates of R&D investment rates provide only lower bounds for the relevant
R&D investment rates. For example, the OECD reports series of R&D expenditures as percentage
of GDP for diﬀerent countries. These expenditures only include formal research, i.e., research
performed in an R&D departments of corporations and government institutions. These ﬁgures do
not include expenditures in technology adoption by all types of entities, nor any informal type of
research. As we suggest below, a key message from this paper, as well as KR’s (2004) paper, is that
informal research eﬀorts are probably the most important source of technological progress, both for
developed and developing countries. KR (2004) calibrate their model using a value of sR =2 .5%,
the R&D investment rate reported by OECD for the U.S in 1995.
Third, the estimated values of β/η are extremely sensitive to the precise target values of sR
and rs. This is because the denominator in the right hand side of (24) can easily approach zero
for reasonable values of rs and sR. The values used by KR (2004) for rs and sR imply a modest
β/η =0 .12. This low ampliﬁcation eﬀect explains why they conclude that diﬀerences in factor
intensities still play a secondary role in accounting for international income diﬀerences in models
with endogenous TFP. However, this low ratio of β/η implies a speed of convergence of 12.5%
rather than 2.5%. Moreover, their conclusion is not robust to the choice of social returns nor
6Negative values for either β or η w o u l db eh a r dt oi n t e r p r e t .
16R&D investment rates. Assuming sR =2 .5% but social returns of 38.5%, which are still on low
spectrum of existing estimates, one obtains β/η =0 .61. Alternatively, assuming rs = 26%, but
sR =3 .65% also yields β/η =0 .6.T h i si sa l s ot h ev a l u eo fβ/η if rs = 32% and sR =3 % ,w h i c h
seem reasonable targets as well. We conclude that existing evidence about social returns to R&D
and R&D investment rates is consistent with relatively large values for β/η, in the order of the
ones we used in our calibration.
R&D investment rates We now compare implied R&D investment rates from our model, KR’s
(2004) model, and some existing evidence. According to Proposition 1, the ratio of R&D investment
































This expression can be easily computed using sR of the U.S as country j and computing A
β
i
using equation (11). For purposes of comparison, we follow KR (2004) and assume sj,R =2 .5%.
As expected, we ﬁnd that the correlation between the sR series from our model and ones from KR
(2004) model (reported in Table A1 of their paper) increases as β/η decreases. This correlation is
83% if β/η =0 .5 but only 64% if β/η =0 .85. To keep close to KR (2004), the remaining of this
section assumes β/η =0 .5. Figure 1 plots both R&D investment rates series. The graph reveals
that both models produce similar R&D investment rates although our series are slightly higher.
KR (2004) assesses their model using evidence compiled by Lederman and Saenz (2003) on
R&D investment rates for a cross section of countries. This data set has the same shortcomings
mentioned in the previous section. Moreover, it may be particularly biased for poor countries in
which most R&D eﬀorts are likely informal and take the form of technology adoption. Lederman
and Saenz also warn that the data “does not include investments in mining exploration or soil
analysis, and thus might imply a bias against natural resource activities and agriculture” (p. 3).
We now compare the Lederman and Saenz data with the series of R&D investment implied by
17the model. The correlations between the models’ series and the data is very similar, 13.27% for
our model and 14.34% for KR’s (2004) model. This correlation, however, is rather low for both
models and it its hard to increase by changing the degree of increasing returns (for our model, the
maximum correlation is 16.64% and it is obtained for β/η =1 /3). The problem becomes more
apparent if one considers only OECD countries, for which the data is likely better. For this subset
of countries, both models predict very similar R&D investment rates (their correlation is 90%).
However, the correlation between the models’ predicted values and the data is actually negative
(−33% for our model and −21% for KR’s (2004) model). The data is plotted in Figure 2.
These correlations are puzzling for both models and suggest that there are important R&D
eﬀorts not captured in the data. We think that the understanding of this puzzle is a major pressing
issue for the development literature in general, but more speciﬁcally for endogenous growth models
with innovation. Part of the issue is that some countries, particularly poor countries, appear to
have levels of TFP productivity that seem “too high” given their factors of production and low
measured sR. One possibility is that the Cobb-Douglas production function is not appropriate
for poor countries because it does not capture diﬀerences in sectoral composition across countries.
Córdoba and Ripoll (2005) explore this issue and ﬁnd a more “proportionate” relationship between
the amount of factors and TFP productivity.
4 A Full-Fledged Model
The extended Solow model of the previous section assumes that the saving rate and R&D investment
rates are exogenous. Under these assumptions, equation (18) solves steady state output per worker
in terms of its ultimate determinants. However, if s and sR are endogenous, equation (18) is not
a solution in terms of fundamentals, and it may provide misleading results. For example, it could
be that a R&D parameters, say R&D taxes, aﬀect both s and sR i nt h es a m ew a y . T h i sw o u l d
explain the positive correlation between A and X, and therefore increase the role of R&D variables
in accounting for income diﬀerences. In this section we study this issue by endogenizing s and sR
using a model of endogenous growth with expanding variety of products and erosion of monopoly
power, in the spirit of Barro and Sala-i-Matin (1997 and 2003, chapter 6). We introduce capital
accumulation to Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s model, as well as distortions to capital accumulation.
In addition, we eliminate scale eﬀects from the model and calibrate it. We show that the results
18from the extended Solow model of the previous section are reinforced by endogenizing s and sR.
In the microfounded model of this section, there are two key exogenous forcing variables, a
‘patent protection’ parameter 1/p, which captures the degree of rent protection for innovators, and
an ‘expropriation’ parameter q, which captures the rate of conﬁscation of physical assets. Both these
parameters proxy for policy or institutional characteristics. It turns out that in equilibrium, both
s and sR depend on p, but only s depends q.M o r e o v e r ,s turns out to depend positively on p while
sR depends negatively on p. Thus, R&D distortions cannot explain the positive correlation between
X and A. The reason is that better patent protection, lower p, strengthens the monopolistic power
of innovators, reduces the fraction of competitive ﬁrms, and reduces the steady state returns on
capital investments. This is because monopolies demand less capital than competitive ﬁrms. As a
result, better patent protection reduces incentives to accumulate capital.
In the calibrated model, the eﬀect of p on s is second order, and as a result, changes in p primarily
aﬀect sR while changes in q only aﬀect s. We use the calibrated model to assess the eﬀects on cross-
country income dispersion of eliminating diﬀerences in p and q respectively. Consistent with the
message of Section 3, diﬀerences in p0s have a secondary role in explaining cross-country income
diﬀerences.
4.1 The Model
There are two type of goods in this economy, a ﬁnal good and N varieties of intermediate goods.
There is production of ﬁnal goods, intermediate goods, and blueprints for new varieties or “ideas”.
Technological progress takes the form of an increase in the number of varieties.
4.1.1 Production of Final Good
Final goods are produced by competitive ﬁrms using the following constant return to scale produc-













where 0 <γ<1, Y is output, xj is the input of the jth intermediate good, N is the number of
varieties of inputs (or more exactly, the set of domestic usable blueprints), and 1/(1 − γ) is the
elasticity of substitution between inputs. To simplify, consider only one single price-taker ﬁnal-good
19producer.
Denote Pj the price of input j and let the price of ﬁnal good be the numeraire. Proﬁtm a x i -





jt for j = {1,..,N}. (27)
4.1.2 Production of Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods are produced using capital and human capital according to x = kαh1−α (we
omit the subscript j). Factor markets are competitive. This implies that the cost of producing one
unit of intermediate good is given by et ≡ rα
ktw1−α
t ,w h e r erk is the rental rate of capital, and w is
the wage rate per unit of human capital.
Nmt intermediate goods are produced by monopolistic ﬁrms and Nct = Nt − Nmt intermediate
goods are produced by competitive ﬁrms. Monopolistic power vanishes randomly according to a
Poisson process with parameter p ≥ 0:av a r i e t yj presently monopolized becomes competitive in
the next interval dT with probability pdT.T h u s , p =0describes everlasting monopolies while
p = ∞ means no monopolistic power at all. Monopolists set prices Pmt to maximize the expected





where πmt =( Pmt − et)xd
t, r(v,t) ≡ (1/(v − t))
R v
t r(s)ds is the average interest between t and v,
and r is the risk-free interest rate. This maximization yields the familiar pricing of mark-up over
marginal cost, while competitive prices equal marginal cost:
Pmt = et/γ; Pct = et. (28)
Plugging prices into (27), the quantities produced by monopolists, xmt, and competitive producers,


















where the dependence on Nt reﬂects domestic research externalities (both positive and negative),
and N∗
t is the technological frontier (a set of internationally available blueprints). In this formula-
tion, international blueprints cannot be used domestically unless some costly adjustment is made.
Parameter η>0 captures the idea that the farther the country is from the frontier, the less costly
it is to create (imitate or adopt) a new variety. The dependence on Lt is required to eliminate scale
eﬀects in levels, and can be motivated by a duplication of eﬀorts in the process of discovering new
ideas.
The inventor of a variety is granted monopolistic power in the production of that variety during
a period of random duration, as described above. We think of p as capturing the degree of patent





4.1.4 Households and Government




where ct is consumption per-capita, u(c)=c1−1/σ/(1 − 1/σ), σ>0 is the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, and ρ>0 is the rate of time preference. The household budget constraint is
·
Kt = wtLt + Tt +[ ( rkt − δ)(1− q) − q]Kt + Nmπmt − Ltct + Tt,
where q is a rate of conﬁscation of physical capital and capital income. This parameter captures
distortions associated with the accumulation of capital. Notice that if q =0this budget constraint
7It is further required that inventors are risk neutral or that they own a large set of innovations.
21reduces to a standard one, while if q =1all physical capital and capital income are conﬁscated. In
the latter case household savings, wtLt + Tt + Nmπmt − Ltct, are used to replace the conﬁscated
capital Kt and to increase the capital stock
·
Kt. Tt are lump sum transfers. The government runs
a balanced budget so that Tt =[ ( rkt − δ)q + q]Kt. Moreover, we assume that monopoly proﬁts
c a n n o tb ec o n ﬁscated, although both monopolistic power and proﬁts are lost if p = ∞.





= σ [rt − ρ], (32)
and 1+r =( 1+rk − δ)(1− q). This last condition can be written as
rkt =




Final goods are used to consume, increase the stock of capital, and for R&D spending, as described
by (4). We continue to assume that the average level of human capital h is exogenous. Therefore,
the law of motion of aggregate human capital is given by (6). The following are additional aggregate
restrictions:
·
Kt = It − δKt,( 3 4 )
·
Nc = pNmt, (35)












The equilibrium of this economy is deﬁned in a standard way. The following proposition provides
the equilibrium solutions for output, proﬁts, and the rental rate of capital.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium levels of ﬁnal goods production Yt, monopolistic proﬁts πmt,a n d






























1−γ > 1. (42)
Proof: Equation (42) follows from (29). Furthermore, all producers face the same factor prices
and therefore employ the same capital-labor ratios, kc/hc = km/hm = K/H.O n ec a nt h u s
write xi = hi (ki/hi)
α = hi (K/H)
α so that xc/xm = hc/hm = a1. Using this result into (36)












Substituting this result and (42) into (26) produces (39). Moreover, substituting (39) and
(43) into (29) and solving for e gives





Furthermore, monopolistic proﬁts are given by πt =( Pmt − et)xd
t. Equation (40) results from
substituting (28), (43) and (44) into this expression, and using (39). Finally, monopolistic
prices implies that rk = αγPmxm/km = αγPmxm (Nm + a1Nc)/K so that the marginal
product of capital for monopolies is larger than the rental price of capital. Equation (41) is
obtained by substituting (28), (44), and (43) into the previous expression.
23Notice that the returns to physical capital investment rk decrease with Nm/Nc. It equals
γα(Yt/Kt) if Nm/Nc = ∞,a n dα(Yt/Kt) if Nm/Nc =0 . This negative relationship is what
explains the main result of this section described below, that better patent protection, which
increases Nm/Nc, also reduces savings.
4.3 Balanced Growth
Along a balanced growth path (BGP) all variables grow at constant rates. A BGP with positive







































so that χ(0) = χ(∞)=1and χ(p) ' 1 for gN close to zero.
We can now show that along a BGP this economy collapses into the extended Solow model of
Section 3, with the important diﬀerence that the saving rate s ≡ I/Y, and the R&D investment
rate sR ≡ R/Y are endogenous in this model. To see the exact mapping between the two models,
note that equation (3) is identical to equation (45), equation (4) follows from (34) and the deﬁnition
of s, and (6) is also a resource constraint in this economy. It remains to show that this economy
also satisﬁes equations (9) and (10). For this purpose, deﬁne A∗
t ≡ N∗
t .T h i sd e ﬁnition and (38)







η sRyt,w h e r ed ≡ χ(p)1−φ,
which is exactly as equation (9), with the important diﬀerence that d is a function of p.T h i sl a s t
result implies that not only s and sR are endogenous in the microfounded model, but also the R&D
productivity parameter d which was assumed constant and equal across countries in Section 3.
24Given the equivalence between the two models along a balanced growth path for particular but
constant values of d, s,a n dsR, the results from Section 3.1 apply for the microfounded model. In
particular, Assumption 1 is still required to prevent a country from falling behind or moving ahead
of the technological frontier. Therefore, we assume in the remainder of the paper that Assumption
1 holds. The following Proposition summarizes the balanced growth properties of the economy,
and the determination of s and sR.
Proposition 3 Let Assumption 1 hold. Along a balanced growth path
























Proof: Equation (46) follows from (15), the deﬁnition of A in (45), and the cost function in (30).
Equation (47) results from (32) and (46). To obtain (48), equate (41) to (33), solve for K/Y,
and substitute the result into (34). Finally, to obtain sR, notice that along a BGP equation
(31) becomes λt =
R ∞
t πmve(r+p)(t−v)dv. Taking derivatives of this expression with respect
to time and rearranging yields πmt/λt = r + p − gλ. This result together with (40) produces
Yt =( r + p − gλ) λt (Nmt + a
γ
1Nct) / (1 − γ). Dividing (37) by this expression, and using
(46) provides the expression for sR.
Equation (46) states that the long run growth rate of the economy is determined by the ex-
ogenous rate of worldwide technological progress. Equations (48) and (49) are the key equations.
They provide the solution for s and sR in terms of the fundamental parameters of the economy, in
particular p and q. Equation (49) states that the R&D investment rate depends on the degree of
patent protection p, but not on the degree of expropriation q. In contrast, the saving rate depends
both on the degree of patent protection and the degree of expropriation. Moreover, it is easy to
check that sR depends negatively on p while κ and s depend positively on p.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t
better patent protection, lower p, increases the R&D investment rate sR but reduces the savings
25rate s. As explained above, this last result arises because better patent protection reduces the
returns on capital investments. Thus, according to the microfounded model of this Section, the
observed positive correlation between X and A cannot be explained by R&D distortions.
We now proceed to derive a solution for y in terms of long-term fundamentals. As noticed, the
common dependence of s and sR on p invalidates the decomposition of Section 3 which is based on
the premise that b A and b X are determined by diﬀerent sets of parameters. Instead, by substituting
(48) and (49) into (18), one ﬁnds:
















b At = b At(p) ≡
µ
(1 − γ)χ(p)1−φ










Finally, incorporating these two results into (18) provides the following result:
Proposition 4 Let Assumption 1 hold. Along a balanced growth path
yt = e A(p) · e X(q,h) (52)
where














Equation (52) factorizes output in two fundamental components, one that depends only on the
frictions in the R&D sector p, and one that depends only on the frictions to capital accumulation
q. According to (52), b At and b Xt need to be adjusted by the factor Ω(p), a factor that is nearly
independent of p if g is close to zero. Since g is actually close to zero in the data, one expects that
a decomposition based on (18) must provide similar results as one based on (52). We conﬁrm this
intuition next.
4.4 Revisiting Levels Accounting
In order to use (52) for variance decomposition, we need to construct series e A(p) and e X(q),w h i c h
a c c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n4r e q u i r e st oe s t i m a t ev a l u e so fp for each country, compute Ω(p),a n d
26adjust b At and b Xt from Section 3. We use the same parameter values for [φ, β/η, β,α, δ, g, gL].
Given β/η, the exact value of η has only marginal eﬀects on the calculations. We thus pick η =0 .41,
consistent with Section 3. Parameter γ is computed using the deﬁnition of β given in equation (45),
a n dw ea s s u m ear i s k - f r e er a t er of 2% for all countries.8 This last assumption implicitly pins down
values for σ and ρ according to equation (47).
To compute p for each country we use equation (51). Given a value for the technological frontier
N∗
t the only unknown in that equation is p.T oﬁnd N∗
t notice that b At(p) is a decreasing function
of p and that 1/p is the life expectancy of a monopoly. Assuming a life expectancy of 100 years for


















Finally, we assume that this technological frontier is identical for all countries. Figure 3 portrays
the expected life of a monopoly as a function of the country’s output per worker relative to the US.
Given p, we use equation (50) to ﬁnd q for each country. The implied values of q are portrayed in
Figure 4.
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of levels accounting for diﬀerent values of β/η using equation
(52). Table 4 follows the same methodology of Tables 1 and 2. It shows that the role of factors
e X increases even more when s and sR are endogenous. The diﬀerences between Table 2, corre-
sponding to the extended Solow model, and Table 4, corresponding to the microfounded model, are
quantitatively small for the lower values of β/η but they are signiﬁcant when β/η is large. This is
particularly true for last column of the tables which captures the role of the ideas gap. This gap is
further narrowed which makes apparent that the large income gaps must be explained mainly by
objects gap.
Finally, Table 5 reports the decomposition of variance based on equation (52). Results are
almost identical to those reported in Table 3. The explanatory power of the factor intensity term
e X increases marginally by 1 percentage point for all values of β/η. The only signiﬁcant diﬀerence
is that all covariance terms are positive in Table 5, while one covariance term is negative in Ta-
ble 3. Overall, the microfounded model conﬁrms that diﬀerences in frictions associated with the
8The value of r determines the level of q, but it is unconsequential for the results.
9Results are not sensitive to the assumed life expectancy of monopolies in the country at the frontier.
27accumulation of knowledge p likely account for only 26 to 36% of the cross-country income variance.
5 Concluding Comments
Countries with higher factor intensities X tend to exhibit higher total factor productivity A.I n
our database, the covariance term accounts for around 35% of the cross-country dispersion of
output per worker. What explains this large covariance? Models with exogenous TFP, such as the
Solow model, provide no explanation for this relationship. However, the covariance term is crucial
for understanding the ultimate causes of cross-country income diﬀerences. In fact, two landmark
studies by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and KR (1997) arrived to opposite conclusions about
t h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo fX versus A partly because they impute the covariance term diﬀerently.
Their way to assign the covariance is arbitrary because their underlying model, a neoclassical
growth model, has no predictions about this covariance. In contrast, growth theory provides a
natural explanation for the covariance between X and A. If technological progress is costly, then
economies with more factors abundance can undertake more R&D activities, accumulate a larger
stock of knowledge, and become more eﬃcient. Thus, growth theory suggests that the covariance
term, or part of it, must be assigned to X.
The focus of the paper is to assess the quantitative predictions of a recent second generation
of growth models characterized by international spillovers and no scale eﬀects. In these models,
the extent to which factors abundance limit eﬃciency levels depend on the speed of diﬀusion of
international knowledge. The slower the speed of diﬀusion, the smaller the role of international
knowledge, and the larger the role of local factors in determining local eﬃciency levels. A way
to quantitatively assess the speed of diﬀusion is through the speed of convergence. We show that
these two speeds are closely and positively associated. We argue that the slow speed of convergence,
extensively documented in the growth regression literature and conﬁrmed by growth regressions
consistent with our model, provides evidence that the speed of diﬀusion is slow. This is the basis
for our main quantitative ﬁnding: that factor intensities play a major role in determining eﬃciency
levels and income diﬀerences, a role signiﬁcantly larger than what has been traditionally recognized.
Alternatively, we ﬁnd that most of the covariance between X and A is explained by X aﬀecting A
rather than the other way around. In fact, we ﬁnd that if the A to X channel were strong, then
the covariance term would be negative rather than positive. This is because, in the model, policies
28directed toward enhancing the accumulation of TFP, such as better patent protection, increase the
fraction of monopolistic ﬁrms in the economy. The ineﬃciency associated with monopolies turns
out to reduce the saving rate and therefore X.
Our quantitative ﬁnding is supportive of earlier ﬁndings by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) who
argue that diﬀerences in factor intensities are the main sources of income diﬀerences. However, the
data, the model, and potential policy implications are completely diﬀerent. Regarding the data, our
human capital series are obtained using Mincerian equations, as suggested by KR (1997). Moreover,
our model is an endogenous growth model with increasing returns and externalities rather than a
neoclassical model. Therefore, there is a potentially large scope for policy intervention, both within
countries and across-countries, a scope that is unclear in the Mankiw, Romer and Weil framework.
Naturally, X and A are not deep parameters in a well microfounded model. However, we show
that a fully microfounded model in which the deep parameters are two distortions, one aﬀecting
the accumulation of capital and one aﬀecting the accumulation of knowledge, reinforce the basic
accounting result. Most diﬀerences in cross-country incomes are explained by distortions in the
accumulation of rival factors of production rather than nonrival factors or knowledge.
Our analysis opens two important future research avenues. First, the R&D investment rates
predicted by the model are at odds with the existing data, a problem already uncovered by KR
(2004). Whether the problem is measurement of R&D investment, or the production technology
used to construct Solow residuals, further research is warranted. Second, in our model accumulation
of physical capital and TFP are endogenous, while the level of human capital is exogenous. This
is a simpliﬁcation also made by KR (2004) in order to focus on a single engine of growth. Future
work should endogenize human capital and TFP simultaneously, and address issues that arise when
there are two growth engines.
Appendix
A Empirical Implementation












and at = At/A∗
t. Using balanced growth






t sRYt/Lt = dha
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t sRytAt














t sRyt = g + gat.
Using this result, our Solow model with endogenous TFP from Section 3 can be summarized







kt = syt − (gL + βg + δ)kt,
gat = dha
−η−β
t sRyt − g.



















Log-linearization of these two equations around the balanced growth path yields



















In addition the two preceding equations together with (53) imply
gyt = −(1 − α)(gL + δ + g(1 − β))
4y
y∗ +( 1− α)β [gL + δ + g(1 − β − η)]
4a
a∗ . (55)
Equations (54) and (55) form a system of log-linearized diﬀerential equations. In matrix form









−(gL + δ + g (1 − β))(1 − α)( 1 − α)β [gL + δ + g(1 − β − η)]









where the determinant of matrix A is detA =( gL + δ + g)(1− α)ηg > 0. The eigenvalues of the
system are solution to
λ2 +[ ( gL + g + δ)(1− α)+( η + αβ)g]
| {z }
b>0





2λi = −[(gL + g + δ)(1− α)+( η + αβ)g] ±
h
[(gL + g + δ)(1− α)+( η + αβ)g]
2 − 4(gL + g + δ)(1− α)ηg
i1/2
.
30It can easily be checked that both roots are negative (or at least will have negative real parts if η is
too large and the roots are complex), so that the system is stable. Note that λi → 0 as η → 0.W e
ﬁnd, numerically, that the eigenvalues are increasing (in absolute terms) in η. Thus, a slow speed
of convergence requires a low value of η.
Given the two eigenvalues, the log-linearized solutions take the form
ln(yt)=l n ( y∗)+v11c1eλ1t + v12c2eλ2t,
ln(at)=l n ( a∗)+v21c1eλ1t + v22c2eλ2t,
where vij are elements of the eigenvector matrix V as given by V −1AV = D,w h e r eD is the
diagonal matrix of eigenvalues. The i column of V is given by Avi = λivi,o r
∙
−(gL + δ + g(1 − β))(1 − α)( 1 − α)β [gL + δ + g (1 − β − η)]











Normalizing v1i =1 , and using only the second row of this system yields v2i =
g
λi+g(η+β).
Substituting this result into the system above gives:
ln(yt)=l n ( y∗)+c1eλ1t + c2eλ2t; (56)
ln(at)=l n ( a∗)+
g
λ1 + g(η + β)
c1eλ1t +
g
λ2 + g (η + β)
c2eλ2t.
Note that asymptotically, ln(yt) ' ln(y∗)+c1eλ1t since |λ1| < |λ2|. Constants c1 and c2 can be
solved for from the following two equations:
c1 + c2 =l n ( y0/y∗),
c1eλ1T + c2eλ2T =l n ( yT/y∗),












eλ1T ln(y0/y∗) − ln(yT/y∗)
i
.
Substituting these two results into (56) one obtains equation (23) in the text.
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33Table 1. Productivity Calculations: Ratios to U.S Values 
Exogenous TFP Models 
 
Ratio   
Country 
 


































































Average, 86 countries 
Standard deviation 
Average, 5 poorest countries 
Correlation with Y/L (logs) 





























 Table 2. Productivity Calculations: Ratios to U.S. Values 
Extended Solow Model 
 
  Average 5 poorest: Average  87  countries: 
Ratio of  Ratio of   
Model  X ˆ   A ˆ  X ˆ   A ˆ 
        
       00 . 0 = η
β   0.23 0.12  0.54  0.56 
      50 . 0 = η
β        0.11 0.27  0.43  0.77 
      60 . 0 = η
β   0.10 0.31  0.41  0.83 
      85 . 0 = η
β   0.07 0.47  0.38  1.00 Table 3. Variance Decomposition 
Extended Solow Model 
 
% contribution to variance of log(Y/L)   
Model  X ˆ   A ˆ  Covariance 
00 . 0 = η
β   39 61  35 
 
50 . 0 = η
β   59 41  20 
60 . 0 = η
β   63 37  15 
85 . 0 = η
β   73 27  -3 
  
 Table 4. Productivity Calculations: Ratios to U.S. Values 
Varieties Model 
 
  Average 5 poorest: Average  87  countries: 










        
       00 . 0 = η
β   0.23 0.12  0.54  0.56 
      50 . 0 = η
β        0.10 0.29  0.40  0.83 
      60 . 0 = η
β   0.09 0.35  0.37  0.91 
      85 . 0 = η
β   0.06 0.56  0.32  1.16 Table 5. Variance Decomposition 
Varieties Model 
 





  Covariance 
00 . 0 = η
β   39 41  35 
 
50 . 0 = η
β   60 40  21 
60 . 0 = η
β   64 36  16 
85 . 0 = η
β   74 26  1 
 Figure 1. R&D as a Percentage of GDP
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